

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 01568 01 OF 02 081916Z

42

ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1568

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 8, 1974

(SALT TWO - 402)

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING CONVERSATIONS INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS OF OVERALL U.S. POSITION, MIRV ICBM THROW-WEIGHT CONCEPT, ALLOWANCE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS, AND SLBMS. END SUMMARY.

2. U.S. POSITION. GRINEVSKY SAID (TO KLOSSON A-542) U.S. PRESENTATIONS DURING THE PAST THREE WEEKS APPEARED TO BE SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAS SOMETHING TO SHOW THE USSR IN THE NEXT ROOM, YET EVERY TIME THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPROACHED THAT ROOM, THE U.S. DELEGATION CLOSED THE DOOR. KLOSSON SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE U.S. HAD SET FORTH THREE CONCRETE PROPOSALS. EACH CALLED FOR EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES. IN CONTRAST, PREVIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD EITHER FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR SUCH TREATMENT OR HAD LEFT UNCLEAR WHAT SOLUTION THE USSR ENVISAGED. FOR EXAMPLE, REGARDING THE CONTROL OF MIRVS, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR LIMITATION ON AN "AGREED PORTION" OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSILES, WHICH BY SOVIET DEFINITION WOULD BE AN UNEQUAL NUMBER, WAS A COMPLETELY VAGUE PROPOSITION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01568 01 OF 02 081916Z

KLOSSON ASKED WHETHER GRINEVSKY WAS IN A POSITION TO SPEAK MORE

CONCRETELY ABOUT WHAT THE USSR HAD IN MIND. GRINEVSKY SAID HE WAS NOT AT THIS TIME.

3. SMOLIN ASKED (EARLE, A-541) IF THE U.S. STATEMENT TODAY HAD COMPLETED THE PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION. EARLE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. SMOLIN THEN ASKED IF THE NUMBER 2,350 HAD BEEN DROPPED AS A U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL AGGREGATES OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS INASMUCH AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD NOT MENTIONED IT. EARLE SAID THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT TODAY HAD COMPLETED, BUT HAD NOT SUMMARIZED THE U.S. POSITION, AND THAT SMOLIN WOULD BE HEARING 2,350 AGAIN, PROBABLY ON TUESDAY.

4. NITZE NOTED (TO SHCHUKIN, A-543) THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT TODAY COMPLETED THE PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION. SHCHUKIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS; NITZE WOULD NOTE THAT HE WAS ASKING NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. SHCHUKIN UNDERSTOOD ALSO THAT THE U.S. HAD SAID ALL THAT IT COULD SAY. NITZE SAID THAT SHCHUKIN, IN TURN, WOULD NOTE THAT NITZE WAS ASKING HIM NO FURTHER QUESTIONS; AND THAT NITZE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS GOING BEYOND THE SOVIET OCTOBER 9 POSITION. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT NITZE AND HE UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER.

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
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 01568 01 OF 02 081916Z

ICBMS THAN THE USSR. KLOSSON SAID THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT ENSURED EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL POTENTIAL IN ICBMS WITH MIRVS. NUMERICAL EQUALITY IN MIRVED ICBMS BY ITSELF WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE THE USSR A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE SINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SS-18 CARRIED A THROW-WEIGHT MANY TIMES HEAVIER THAN THAT OF THE MINUTEMAN III.

6. GRINEVSKY SAID (TO KLOSSON, A-542) THAT THROW-WEIGHT WAS NOT THE ONLY CRITERION FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF MISSILE CAPABILITIES. THERE WAS ALSO ACCURACY, THE NUMBER OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES, AND OTHER FACTORS. WHEN KLOSSON ASKED HOW THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED TO MEASURE THE POTENTIAL OF MISSILES, GRINEVSKY REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT. GRINEVSKY ASKED, ASSUMING A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF MINUTEMAN III WHICH COULD BE MIRVED, WHAT WAS TO PREVENT THE U.S. FROM PUTTING MIRVS ON THE REMAINING MINUTEMEN. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT COMPARING MRVS WITH MIRVS WAS SOMEWHAT LIKE COMPARING A POBEDA WITH A CHAIKA. THE U.S. HAD NOT PROPOSED ANY LIMITATION ON MIRVS, WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 01568 02 OF 02 081933Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1568

EXDIS/SALT

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7. SMOLIN QUESTIONED (EARLE, A-541) WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL AGGREGATE POTENTIAL OF THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SUGGESTED SUB-LIMITS ON ICBM THROW-WEIGHT AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT, MIRVED AND UN-MIRVED. IN REPLY, EARLE EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH THE U.S. PROPOSAL INCLUDED THOSE ELEMENTS, THEY HAD TO BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL AGGREGATE AND THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PROPOSING THAT THEY BE CONSIDERED AS SEPARATE LIMITS.

8. ALLOWANCE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS. TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-540) SAID

HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE TERM "ALLOWANCE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS." HE SAID THAT THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT FIGURE SHOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY MISSILES BUT HEAVY BOMBERS AND CARRIER-BASED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. ROWNY REPLIED THAT CARRIER AIRCRAFT WERE NOT ENVISAGED IN THE U.S. FORMULATION. HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE THROW-WEIGHT APPLIED ONLY TO MISSILES, ANOTHER TYPE OF MEASUREMENT MUST BE APPLIED TO HEAVY BOMBERS. TRUSOV SAID UNTIL THEY KNEW HOW THE "ALLOWANCE" WOULD BE CALCULATED AND WHAT IT WAS, THEY COULDN'T ADDRESS THE CONCEPT.

9. SMOLIN ASKED (EARLE, A-541) WHAT THE U.S. HAD IN MIND WHEN IT SUGGESTED "ALLOWANCE" FOR THE HEAVY BOMBER FLEETS OF BOTH SIDES. EARLE TOLD HIM THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED AT
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PAGE 02 SALT T 01568 02 OF 02 081933Z

THIS TIME TO DISCUSS THAT ISSUE IN ANY DETAIL, BUT THAT SMOLIN SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT BOMBERS ARE DIFFERENT FROM MISSILES, THE FORMER HAVING A MEASURABLE QUALITY, THROW-WEIGHT, WHEREAS THE CAPABILITY OF THE LATTER IS DEPENDENT ON NUMEROUS FACTORS INCLUDING PARTICULARLY, THE PRESENT STATUS OF UNLIMITED AIR DEFENSE.

10. GRINEVSKY ASKED (KLOSSON, A-542) HOW THE U.S. INTENDED WITHIN THE TOTAL AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT FOR CENTRAL SYSTEMS TO COUNT THE PAYLOAD FOR HEAVY BOMBERS. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD REFERRED TO AN ALLOWANCE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND HAD NOT USED THE WORD PAYLOAD. THIS FORMULATION REFLECTED THE FACT THAT HEAVY BOMBERS COMPARED TO MISSILES ARE QUITE DIFFERENT IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

11. SLBMS. TRUSOV QUESTIONED (ROWNY, A-540) U.S. LOGIC OF FIRST SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON ICBM MIRVS AND ONLY THEN ADDRESSING SLBM MIRVS. WASN'T THE REASON, HE ASKED, SIMPLY THAT THE USSR HAS NO SLBM MIRVS WHILE THE U.S. IS INTENSIVELY DEPLOYING THEIRS IN GREAT NUMBERS? ROWNY REMINDED TRUSOV THE U.S. SIDE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ICBM WAS THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEM AND HENCE THE LOGIC FOR DEALING WITH ITS FIRST. AS BETWEEN ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE FORMER ARE THE MOST NUMEROUS AND MOST POWERFUL. FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE MORE VULNERABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE AT FIXED LOCATIONS AND POTENTIALLY MORE DESTRUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY COMBINE HIGHER YIELDS WITH BETTER ACCURACY.

12. ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. KLOSSON SAID (TO GRINEVSKY, A-542) THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT MINISTER SEMENOV HAD MEANT TODAY IN HIS STATEMENT WHICH REJECTED A PROPOSAL ON THE LIMITATION OF AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS. IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS THE U.S. HAD BEEN SPECIFIC IN ITS PROPOSAL FOR AN EQUAL AGGREGATE FOR THE TWO SIDES IN THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT SEMENOV WAS REFERRING TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL OF LAST MAY FOR AN EQUAL SUBLIMIT ON

ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. JOHNSON

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